The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, widely known as the NPT, has opened its latest five-year review conference in New York under the shadow of war, diplomacy, and renewed doubts about the future of the global nuclear order.
Delegates gathering for the conference are confronting one of the most serious crises in the treaty’s history following the recent conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran. At the centre of discussions is Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile how much remains, where it is located, and whether diplomacy can still provide a credible path forward.
For many analysts, the stakes go far beyond Iran. They argue that the conflict has exposed deep structural weaknesses in the treaty and raised urgent questions about whether the NPT can continue to serve as the cornerstone of global nuclear governance.
A Treaty Under Pressure
The NPT entered into force in 1970 after opening for signature in 1968. It is one of the most widely supported arms control agreements in history, with 191 member states.
Its central bargain is simple. Countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them. In return, the five officially recognised nuclear powers the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom and France commit to eventual disarmament.
All member states also retain the right to develop peaceful nuclear technology under international safeguards monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The treaty rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy.
While the non-proliferation system has had significant success in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, critics say progress on disarmament has lagged badly.
Many experts now argue that nuclear-armed states are modernising arsenals rather than reducing them, weakening trust among non-nuclear members.
Iran at the Centre of Debate
The immediate focus of the conference is Iran’s nuclear programme.
Iran joined the NPT in 1974 and has long argued that, as a signatory, it has the same rights as any other member state including the right to enrich uranium for peaceful civilian purposes under safeguards.
That position has repeatedly clashed with U.S. and Israeli concerns that uranium enrichment could provide a pathway to weapons capability.
Just before the recent conflict escalated, Badr Albusaidi, who had been mediating between Washington and Tehran, said Iran had agreed in principle to zero accumulation, zero stockpiling, and full verification of its existing enriched uranium by the IAEA.
According to the proposal, Iran’s stockpile would have been downblended to natural uranium levels and converted into reactor fuel.
However, within hours, U.S. and Israeli strikes reportedly began, halting diplomatic momentum and plunging the issue back into confrontation.
The timing has become a major source of controversy, with critics arguing that military action undercut a possible negotiated settlement.
The Shadow of the JCPOA
Much of the debate also returns to the collapse of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
That deal was reached between Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany.
Under its terms, Iran reduced its enriched uranium stockpile by 98 percent, capped enrichment at 3.67 percent, reduced centrifuge numbers, and accepted one of the most intrusive inspection systems ever implemented.
In exchange, nuclear-related sanctions were eased.
The IAEA repeatedly verified Iran’s compliance in the early years of the agreement.
However, in 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the deal, calling it fundamentally flawed.
Following the withdrawal and reimposition of sanctions, Iran gradually exceeded some limits under the agreement.
By early 2025, Iran was enriching uranium to 60 percent purity the highest level reached by a non-nuclear-weapon state. Weapons-grade uranium is generally around 90 percent.
Supporters of diplomacy argue that the collapse of the JCPOA destroyed a workable framework that had kept Iran’s programme under monitoring and control.
Allegations of Double Standards
One of the most politically sensitive issues at the conference is Israel’s position outside the treaty.
Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it has never officially confirmed this policy of ambiguity.
Israel is not a signatory to the NPT.
That reality has led many countries and analysts to accuse the international system of inconsistency.
They argue that an NPT member such as Iran faces sanctions, inspections and military threats, while a non-signatory regional power with undeclared nuclear capabilities remains outside the treaty structure.
This perceived imbalance has become central to criticism that the NPT is increasingly shaped by geopolitics rather than equal rules.
Some experts warn that if countries conclude nuclear weapons provide immunity or strategic leverage, the treaty’s legitimacy could erode further.
Disarmament Commitments Under Scrutiny
Beyond Iran, frustration is growing over the pace of disarmament among nuclear powers.
The five recognised nuclear-weapon states remain committed under the treaty to pursue negotiations toward disarmament.
Yet instead of shrinking arsenals dramatically, many are investing in modernisation programmes, delivery systems, and upgraded warheads.
At the same time, tensions among major powers have risen sharply.
The Russia-Ukraine War, rivalry between the U.S. and China, and instability in the Middle East have reinforced the role of nuclear deterrence in strategic planning.
Critics say this sends a damaging message to non-nuclear states asked to permanently renounce such weapons.
For many developing nations, the treaty increasingly appears to impose obligations unevenly.
Rise of an Alternative Treaty
Disappointment with the NPT process helped drive support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in 2017.
That treaty seeks to ban nuclear weapons entirely and was championed largely by non-nuclear states and civil society groups.
However, none of the recognised nuclear powers have joined it.
Its supporters argue it represents the moral and legal future of disarmament. Critics say it lacks practical enforcement and participation by states that actually possess nuclear weapons.
Still, its emergence reflects growing impatience with the slow pace of change under the NPT system.
Can the Review Conference Deliver Results?
Review conferences are held every five years to assess implementation of the treaty and agree future steps.
Historically, consensus has been difficult.
The last major successful outcomes came in 1995, 2000 and 2010, while several subsequent conferences ended without final agreements.
This year’s meeting faces even steeper obstacles.
Delegates must navigate the aftermath of conflict involving Iran, continued war in Ukraine, worsening great-power rivalry, and mistrust between nuclear and non-nuclear states.
Any final declaration would require compromise on highly contentious issues including disarmament timelines, regional security, safeguards, and the Middle East nuclear question.
Diplomats privately acknowledge that achieving consensus may be extremely difficult.
What Happens If Confidence Collapses?
The NPT remains one of the most important pillars of international security. Without it, experts warn, more countries might consider seeking nuclear weapons.
The treaty has helped limit proliferation for decades, even if imperfectly.
But its power depends not only on legal obligations it depends on belief that the system is fair, enforceable and worth preserving.
If countries lose confidence in that premise, pressures could grow for regional arms races, especially in volatile areas.
The Middle East, East Asia and parts of Europe are often cited as regions where security anxieties could intensify if the treaty weakens significantly.
A Defining Moment
As delegates meet in New York, the conference is not simply about technical safeguards or diplomatic wording.
It is about whether the world’s main nuclear pact can adapt to a harsher geopolitical era.
The war involving Iran has sharpened old questions: Can peaceful nuclear rights coexist with non-proliferation demands? Can nuclear powers preach restraint while expanding arsenals? Can rules apply equally to allies and rivals?
The answers may determine not only the success of this review conference, but the future credibility of the global nuclear order itself.
For now, the NPT survives. Whether it emerges strengthened or further diminished—will depend on what happens next in diplomacy, conflict zones, and the negotiating rooms of New York.
